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J. LON CARLSON* & CHARLES W. BAUSELL, JR.**t

Financing Superfund: An
Evaluation of Alternative Tax
Mechanisms
ABSTRACT
Since the initial Superfund was created in 1980, it has become
apparentthat the ultimate cost of cleanup of hazardous wastes will
reach into the billions of dollars. This paper considers a variety of
tax mechanisms that could be employed to generate revenues for
federally-funded cleanupsof abandonedhazardouswaste sites. These
tax mechanisms are analyzed in the context of a number of goals
that are considered socially desirable. The conclusion is that no
single tax alternative emerges as superior and that, instead, the
preferred option will depend on the relative importance placed on
the different goals.
1. INTRODUCTION

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)' provided a $1.6 billion fund, referred
to as Superfund, for the purpose of cleaning up the nation's abandoned
hazardous waste sites. However, the intervening years have led to the
realization that the original funding level is inadequate for the task at
hand. Cleanup efforts to date suggest that the total cost ultimately incurred
could be enormous, reaching into the billions of dollars. For example,
the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) has put its upper estimate of
federal spending at $39. 1 billion.2 The Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA) has estimated that federal spending could exceed $100 billion.'
*Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Illinois State University.
**Economist, U.S. General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C.
tAcknowledgements: The authors wish to thank Vic Rezendes, Jeffrey Heil, Hugh Wessinger,
and Chuck Veehom for their useful comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this paper.
The views expressed in this paper are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
GAO and should not be construed as such.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§9601-9657 (1982).
2. GENERXLAcCOUNTING OFFICE, CLEANING Up HAZARDOUS WASTES; AN OVERVIEW OF SUPERFUND
REAUTHORIZATION ISSUES, GAOIRCED-85-69, 17 (Mar. 29, 1985). It should be noted that this figure
is based on conservative assumptions regarding EPA's ability to recover costs from responsible
parties. To the extent that the EPA is able to recover additional costs from responsible parties, this
figure would be reduced. See id. at 21. All figures are in undiscounted 1983 dollars.
3. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, SUPERFUND STRATEGY. OTA-ITE-252-3 (Mar. 1985).
Additionally, as reported by the General Accounting Office, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) has estimated that total federal spending could reach $22.7 billion. However, according
to the U.S. GAO, assumptions made by EPA tended to bias EPA's estimates upward. See GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 2, at 18-20.
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In addition to involving substantially greater cleanup costs than were
initially anticipated, it has become apparent that considerable time will
be involved as well. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
has estimated that the cleanup effort could be completed by 1999' while
the GAO and OTA have projected completion dates of 2017' and 20356,
respectively. Both total cleanup costs and the time period involved, have
implications for the question of what the flow of funds over time should
be. More importantly, the amount of funds required will have a substantial
impact on the determination of the appropriate mechanism for financing
Superfund.
This paper addresses the question of how the revenues for a continued
Superfund could be generated. With respect to this issue a number of
approaches have been proposed. The majority of these rely on some form
of taxation and can be grouped into three principal categories: 1) feedstock
taxes, 2) industry-wide revenue taxes, and 3) waste-end taxes. Additional
sources of cleanup funding might include general tax revenues, interest
earned on the balance in the fund, costs recovered from responsible
parties, and fines.
The fact that so many different financing alternatives have been proposed reflects the variety of goals explicit or implicit in those alternatives.
As discussed below, some of these goals conflict with one another in the
context of any single tax alternative, thus complicating the selection
process. The purpose of this paper is to examine the major tax alternatives
that have been proposed and the goals that these alternatives are meant
to achieve, and to evaluate each of the tax alternatives vis-a-vis those
goals.
The remainder of the paper considers the relative effectiveness, in the
context of specific goals, that each of the alternative tax mechanisms may
have. Part II examines six alternative taxing mechanisms. In Part III,
seven goals that the selected tax alternative might be expected to achieve
are considered. Part IV consists of an evaluation of each of the tax
alternatives vis-a-vis the goals, and Part V summarizes the results.
II. ALTERNATIVE TAX SYSTEMS
Six alternative tax mechanisms that could be implemented to generate
revenues for the Superfund are considered:7 1) a feedstock tax on the
primary production inputs from the chemical and petroleum industries
that result in the generation of hazardous wastes;' 2) a broad-based in4. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 2, at 17.
5. Id.

6. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at 3.
7. While these alternatives are treated separately here, it needs to be pointed out that a combination
of these alternatives could be employed to finance Superfund.
8. A feedstock tax on 42 chemicals and petroleum provided the bulk of the $1.6 billion for the
original Superfund. 26 U.S.C. §§4611-12, 4661-62 (1982).
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dustry tax that could be imposed, for example, on the revenues of firms

generating some minimum level of sales;9 and 3) four versions of the
waste-end ta, that is, a tax on the waste streams ultimately generated
and disposed of.'0
Feedstock Tax

CERCLA provided for the imposition of a feedstock tax on 42 different
petrochemicals, ranging from $0.22 per ton to $4.87 per ton, and a tax

of $0.79 per barrel on crude oil received at U.S. refineries or imported
into the United States." Tax rates for individual feedstocks were based
on estimates of the percentage amount of all hazardous wastes generated
and attributable to specific feedstocks. This measure was meant to serve
as a proxy for the composition of wastes found at Superfund sites. These
rates were then modified, where necessary, to avoid potential adverse
economic impacts on specific industries. 2 The feedstock and petroleum
taxes have provided the bulk of Superfund revenues, accounting for approximately 70 percent of total receipts in 1983.3
Broad-Based Industry Tax
A number of legislative proposals have embraced the idea of using
some form of a broad-based industry tax to provide at least part of the
financing for Superfund. Examples include the Superfund excise tax in
S.511' and the excise tax in H.R. 2817." The primary appeal of a broad9. Such a tax was proposed in the Senate's version of the 1985 Superfund reauthorization bill,
S.51, SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, A BILL To EXTEND AND AMEND
THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY AcT oF 1980, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES, REP. No. 73, 99th Cong.. Ist Sess. (Apr. 15, 1985), and an early version of
the corresponding House bill, H.R. 2817, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, A BILL
TO AMEND THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF

1980, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, H.R. REP. No. 253, PARTS I, II, III, IV, AND V, 99th Cong.. Ist
Sess. (Aug. 1, 1985).
10. We assume that any hazardous waste generated that is subsequently recycled or recovered
would be exempt from all four versions of the waste-end tax considered here and that the tax would
only be imposed on the quantity of waste remaining after the application of waste reduction techniques
such as dewatering.
11. 26 U.S.C. §§4611-12. 4661-62 (1982).
12. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE FEASIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE TAX SYSTEMS FOR SUPERFUND CERCLA SECTION 301(a)(1)(G) STUDY 2-5 (Dec. 1984).
13. LAZARRI AND GELB, PROPOSED TAx INCREASES AND THE U.S. PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, Congressional Research Service Report No. 85-81 E 7 (1985).
14. Specifically, S.51 called for the imposition of 8 percent tax on the sales of firms with revenues
in excess of S5 million per year. S.51, SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS,
A BILL To EXTEND AND AMEND THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION,

AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, REPORT No. 73, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (Apr.
15, 1985).
15. H.R. 2817 called for a broad-based industry tax sufficient to raise $900 million per year for
the years 1986-1990. H.R. 2817, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, A BILL TO AMEND
THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES, H.R. REP. No. 253, PARTS I, II, III, IV, AND V, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug.
1, 1985).
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based tax stems from its ability to generate substantial amounts of revenue
without imposing a great burden on any individual taxpayer. This could
be achieved by keeping the tax rate very low and limiting the pool of
potential taxpayers to firms with annual revenues or sales in excess of
some minimum threshold amount.' 6
Waste-End Taxes
Hazardous waste generation, in and of itself, does not result in Superfund
sites. Rather, it is the disposition of those wastes, that is, the treatment,
storage, or disposal (TSD) option employed, as well as the quantity of
wastes involved that may ultimately lead to adverse health effects, environmental damage, etc.' 7 Consequently, waste-end taxes possess logical
appeal as a means of financing Superfund activities. In particular, they
can be used to manipulate the choice of specific TSD options by increasing
the relative cost of specific options, for example, increase the per unit
cost of landfill disposal of a hazardous waste relative to the per unit cost
of incineration of the same waste. Additionally, the resulting increase in
the price of TSD options that are taxed will provide an incentive for
waste reduction efforts, and hence mitigate the potential for the creation
of new Superfund sites. The extent to which a waste-end tax will, in fact,
affect future waste generation rates and the use of specific treatment,
storage and disposal practices employed depends on the specific form of
the tax. 8 The forms of a waste-end tax considered here include: 1) a flat
tax, 2) a tax differentiated on the basis of the TSD option employed, 3)
a tax differentiated on the basis of the degree of hazard of the waste, and
4) a tax differentiated on the basis of the TSD option employed and the
degree of hazard of the waste.
1) Flat Tax
The simplest waste-end tax is a fiat tax per unit of waste treated, stored,
or disposed. Such a tax is currently imposed under Section 4681 of
CERCLA. '9A fiat waste-end tax does not distinguish between types of
16. For example, it has been estimated that a tax of 5.5 percent on the sales of firms whose net
corporate receipts exceed $5 million annually could generate $1 billion in annual tax revenues, and
that an 8 percent tax on the sales of firms in excess of $10 million would raise the price of most
products by a few tenths of one cent. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
17. Specific examples of adverse health and environmental effects include cancers resulting from
exposure to hazardous wastes and the contamination of underground aquifers by hazardous wastes.
18. A number of states have instituted some form of a waste-end tax to finance state-directed
cleanups of abandoned hazardous waste sites. For a discussion of states' experiences with waste-

end

taxes see U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STATE EXPERIENCES WITH TAxEs ON GENERATORS

OR DISPOSERS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE, GAO/RCED-84-146 (May 4, 1984) and OFFICE OFTECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, supra note 4. at 46-48.
19. 26 U.S.C. § 4681 imposes a tax of $2.13 per dry weight ton of hazardous waste received at
a qualified hazardous waste disposal facility.
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wastes or TSD methods employed. Consequently, of the waste-end taxes
considered here, it is assumed least effective in encouraging preferred
shifts between TSD methods.2" Additionally, there is little evidence to
indicate that a flat waste-end tax set at relatively low rates ($2-$10 per
ton) will encourage substantial reductions in the quantities of wastes
generated. 2'
2) Differentiation on the Basis of TSD Option Employed
Depending upon the specific TSD option employed, the same waste
stream can ultimately impose different levels of risk on society. For
example, incineration of one metric ton of a hazardous waste is assumed
to impose a smaller amount of risk on society than would landfill disposal
of the same waste.' This variation in risk was recognized in the 1984
amendments to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
(RCRA)' which, in part, are designed to substantially reduce the extent
4
to which landfills are employed as a means of permanent disposal.1
To the extent that one of the goals of the tax is to encourage a shift in
the distribution of wastes between the various treatment and disposal
methods available, a waste-end tax differentiated on the basis of the
treatment or disposal method employed should be considered. By varying
tax rates according to the degree of hazard associated with different TSD
options, such a tax could be used to effectively eliminate any cost advantages that an undesirable, that is, more hazardous, option may currently possess.
3) Differentiation on the Basis of Degree of Hazard
A third type of waste-end tax, similar in concept to the one just described, is differentiated according to the degree of hazard associated with
the waste in question, but is held constant across treatment and disposal
options. Just as the same waste disposed of by different means can impose
varying levels of risk on society according to the disposal option em20. A preferred shift refers to one which leads to the generation of less hazardous waste for a
given production process, or results in the use of a safer, i.e., less risky, disposal option for a given
waste stream. Because a flat waste-end tax does not distinguish between waste types or the type of
TSD option employed, it does not alter the relative cost of the different options available. Consequently, by itself, it does not provide any economic incentive to prefer one option over another.
Additionally, it does not appear to give the waste generator significant incentives to alter the production process in ways that might lead to the generation of different, less hazardous waste streams.
21. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFicE, HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT: RECENT CHANGES AND
PoucY ALTERNATVEs 70 (May 1985).

22. Id. at 39.
23. The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984. Pub. L. No. 616. 98th Cong., 2d
Sess., 98 Stat. 3221, 46 U.S.C. §§6901-7000 (1984).
24. For a discussion of the 1984 RCRA amendments and their impact on the landfill disposal of
hazardous wastes, see CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFcE, supra note 23, at 36-58.
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ployed, so can wastes that are treated or disposed of in the same manner
but differ according to the inherent degree of hazard. Consequently, another option is to impose a higher tax on wastes with a greater degree of
hazard, thus raising their cost of treatment, storage, or disposal relative
to other wastes.
A tax differentiated on the basis of degree of hazard has the effect of
discouraging the treatment, storage, or disposal of wastes that in and of
themselves pose the greatest risk to society. To the extent that the risk
associated with different wastes varies, ceteris paribus, a differentiated
waste-end tax may be more efficient than, for example, a flat tax. However, because this option does not distinguish between the TSD options
employed, its primary effect would, in all likelihood, be on quantities of
waste generated rather than on the TSD option employed.
4) Differentiationon the Basis of Degree of Hazard and Disposal
Option Employed
The fourth type of waste-end tax considered here is differentiated according to both the degree of hazard associated with the waste in question
and the final disposition of that waste (that is, it is fully differentiated).
In theory, this form of a waste-end tax would most accurately reflect the
social cost associated with the ultimate disposition of a specific hazardous
waste stream. This is because the waste in question and the TSD option
employed work together to generate the level of risk imposed on society.
However, because it would impose the difficulties associated with wasteend tax systems 2 and 3 previously discussed, this version of a wasteend tax is probably the most difficult to administer.
1m. GOALS OF THE TAX SYSTEM
In the process of reviewing various Superfund reauthorization proposals
and studies of the relative effectiveness of different tax systems, a number
of associated goals were identified which the tax selected might be expected to achieve.'s Depending upon the source, individual goals have
received varying degrees of emphasis. Our purpose is not to evaluate the
relative importance of these goals but to assess, qualitatively, the degree
to which a given tax system can be expected to achieve each of the goals
identified. The following seven goals are considered: 1) administrative
feasibility, 2) revenue generation, 3) incentives for waste reduction/use
25. See notes 2, 5, 11. 14, 15, and 23 for references to these studies. See also DR. WILLIAM
NORDHAUS AND MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS CENTER, INC., SUPERFUND FINANCING: AN ANALYSIS OF
CERCLA TAXES AND ALTERNATIVE REVENuE APPROACHES (1984). (Management Analysis Center,
Inc., 2828 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20007) [hereinafter cited as MANAGEMENT
ANALYSIS CENTER].
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of alternative TSD methods, 4) equity, 5) economic efficiency, 6) reduced
potential for litigation, and 7) complementarity of the tax to the overall
regulatory scheme.
As it becomes apparent below, in the context of a particular tax system,
certain of these goals are mutually exclusive. For example, a tax that
induces producers to reduce the amount of hazardous waste they generate
will, all other things held constant, inevitably lead to a reduction in the
quantity of tax revenues collected over time. Similarly, a tax that accurately reflects the social costs associated with the generation and treatment/
disposal of individual waste streams, that is, is economically efficient,26
will in all likelihood be much more administratively cumbersome than a
flat (per unit) tax placed on a few major hazardous wastes. The implication
of this fact is that a combination of the tax systems being considered here
may be preferred to any single tax system.
Administrative Feasibility
A necessary feature of any tax employed is that it be administratively
feasible. Specifically, we are concerned with how easily the tax can be
implemented, that is, the tax base 7 identified and enforced. Ease of
enforcement implies that potential taxpayers can be reasonably monitored
to ensure that they are paying the amount of tax required. All of this
suggests the need for a sufficiently complete data base, for example,
quantities and types of waste generated, TSD option employed, quantities
of feedstocks produced, annual revenues of affected firms, and degree of
hazard associate with specific wastes.28
Revenue Generation
One of the primary functions of the Superfund tax is to generate revenues to finance the cleanup of existing Superfund sites.29 Consequently,
it is important to assess the magnitude of revenues that a specific tax
could be expected to generate, as well as the stability of the revenue
26. For a discussion of social costs and efficiency in waste disposal see infra text at notes 4143. See also Carlson, Johnson and Ulen, An Economic Analysis of Illinois' New Hazardous Waste

Law-PA. 82-572. 24 NAT. REs. J. 865 (1984).
27. The tax base refers to the individuals responsible for paying the tax.
28. Note that the type of data required is a function of the specific tax implemented. With respect
to data availability, one of the primary factors affecting ease of implementation and enforcement
will be the number of potential taxpayers, i.e., the tax base. In general, it can be assumed that all
other things held constant, the smaller the tax base, the easier it will be to implement and enforce
the tax. For example, in the case of hazardous waste generation there are far fewer producers of
primary chemical feedstocks than there are generators of hazardous wastes. This suggests that, for
example, a feedstock tax would more easily achieve the goal of administrative feasibility than would
a waste-end tax imposed on generators of hazardous wastes.
29. Additionally, revenues from the fund have been earmarked for the removal of accidental spills
of hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982).
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stream over time. While any one of the tax structures being considered
here is capable of generating a substantial amount of revenues, it is shown
below that there may be differences with respect to the stability of the
revenue stream over time.
Incentivesfor Waste Reduction/Use ofAlternative TSD Methods
The number of Superfund sites ultimately cleaned up will depend not
only upon the results of past TSD practices and waste generation rates,
but upon current and future practices and generation rates as well. Consequently, as a means of minimizing the long-run costs of the Superfund
program, one of the goals of the tax employed should be to encourage
both reductions in the quantities of waste generated that require treatment,
storage, or disposal, and shifts to TSD options that are less likely to result
in the creation of new Superfund sites."
Equity
It needs to be noted from the outset that there is no clearly established
or generally agreed upon outcome that is considered "equitable" vis-avis tax incidence. This is especially true with respect to financing the
cleanup of Superfund sites. Rather, a number of outcomes could be
considered equitable depending upon one's point of view. With respect
to the question of who should pay the cost of federally funded cleanups,
three views are considered here.
The first view is reflected in the current law which is based on the
belief that equity will be served by requiring that those whose past actions
are responsible for the creation of Superfund sites, that is, generators or
disposers of hazardous wastes or producers of input (feedstocks) which
lead to the creation of hazardous wastes, pay for their cleanup." A second,
related but not identical, view is that those who have benefited from
presumably less expensive past disposal practices should pay. 2 In this
case, both producers and consumers of goods whose production generates
hazardous wastes would be liable for Superfund cleanup costs. A third
view maintains that, because the problems currently faced were not foreseen at the time that the wastes were disposed of, equity would best be
served by spreading the financial burden of cleanup costs across as large
a group as possible." While all of these approaches result in what could
30. It should be clear that to the extent that the tax employed depends upon the quantity of waste
generated and disposed of. this goal conflicts with the goal of a stable revenue stream over time.
Resolution of this conflict is a matter for policymakers and is not considered here. Suffice it to say
that a conflict could theoretically be mitigated through the imposition of a tax rate structure that
increases over time, thus compensating for any reduction in the tax base resulting from waste reduction

efforts.
31. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 14, at 3-3.
32. Id. See also MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS CENTER, supra note 27, at 49-50.
33. Note that this view could be cited in support of the argument for the imposition of a broadbased tax. See MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS CENTER, supra note 27, at 49-50, and 88-89.
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be viewed as an "equitable" solution, each involves a different tax base
and hence a different distribution of impacts of the tax.
In addition to the notions of equity outlined above, public finance theory
distinguishes between two primary approaches to equity in the context
of tax incidence: the benefits principle and the ability-to-pay principle. 4
According to the benefits principle, an individual should pay an amount
of tax that reflects the benefit that they receive from the public service
in question. This might suggest that the Superfund tax burden should
be borne by all those individuals who benefit from ensuing cleanups, that
is, society at large. However, this conclusion ignores the fact that these
cleanups are necessitated by past actions of specific individuals-generators and disposers of hazardous wastes. In fact, benefits accrued to
generators of hazardous wastes in the form of relatively low disposal
costs, and hence lower overall production costs than would be the case
under the current set of regulations governing the disposal of hazardous
wastes. Assuming that the disposal costs initially incurred did not reflect
the full costs of production, the benefits principle might therefore be cited
as justification for a tax paid by producers to fund cleanup costs.
The second approach to equity in the context of public finance theory
is the ability-to-pay principle. This principle holds that individuals should
pay taxes based on the amount of income that they receive. 6 This approach is illustrated by the notions of horizontal and vertical equity.
Horizontal equity is achieved by making individuals with equal incomes
pay equal amounts of tax. 37 Vertical equity requires that individuals with
different incomes be charged different amounts of tax.38
According to the ability-to-pay principle7, if we assume that any Superfund tax should be borne by the parties responsible for the creation
of Superfund sites, horizontal equity would require that firms generating
similar income streams be taxed at equal rates. Additionally, a firm's tax
rate should be in proportion to its income stream in order to achieve
vertical equity. The ability-to-pay principle could in turn be combined
with, and modified according to, any one of the three "equitable" solutions discussed above.
Economic Efficiency
When production activities result in the imposition of costs on third
parties, that is, individuals who are neither producers nor consumers of
the good in question, a negative externality is said to exist.3 9 To the extent
34. R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE INTHEORY

35.
36.
37.
38.

AND PRACTICE

211 (1976).

Id. at 212-14.
Id. at 215-17.
Id. at 216.
Id.

39. R. JUST, D. HuETH, & A. ScHMn-z,APPLIED WELFARE ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY, 268-

74 (1982). An example of a negative externality is the risk imposed on society by the landfill disposal
of a hazardous waste. To the extent that the generator of the hazardous waste does not take account
of the increased risk to society, society is bearing a cost for which it receives no benefit.
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FIGURE I
that such costs are not taken into account in the decision process the
result will usually be to produce more of the good than is socially optimal.
As an aid to understanding this concept consider Figure 1.
Figure 1 depicts the supply and demand schedules for a good, X,
production of which results in the generation of a hazardous waste.' The
supply curve, labelled Sp, reflects the private costs, that is, costs such
as payment for productive inputs, incurred directly by the producer in
the course of producing X. Considering only these private costs and the
market demand for X, as indicated by the demand curve D, the equilibrium
quantity of production is Qp.
However, because production of X results in the generation of a hazardous waste, there is a potential for additional costs to be imposed on
society as a whole. These costs are a function of any risk that society
may face as a result of the TSD option employed, and are assumed to
be proportional to the total amount of risk involved. Assume that the
waste is disposed in such a manner that a positive amount of risk is
40. For simplicity, X is assumed to be produced in a perfectly competitive market.
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imposed on society. Taking account of these additional costs has the effect
of shifting the supply curve up and to the left, such as Ss in Figure 1.
(The greater the amount of risk involved, the greater this shift would-be.)
Ss reflects both the private and social costs of the production of X. Note
that the new equilibrium quantity of output, Qs, is less than the equilibrium quantity resulting when only private production costs are taken into
account.
The foregoing suggests that in those situations where a negative externality exists, policies should be pursued that will generate an upward
shift of the supply curve, that is, lead to an "internalization of the externality." In this way, production levels will move toward the social
optimum. Since the imposition of a tax on producers has the effect of
shifting up the supply curve, taxes constitute a potential policy option."
Taxes, if properly designed, will also reflect the social cost associated
with each level of output. Consider Figure 2.
The supply curve labeled Sp reflects the private costs of production,
41. Jusr, Huam, & ScHMrrz, supra note 41, at 275-76.
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while the supply curve labeled Ss accounts for both private and social
costs. The vertical difference between Ss and Sp, denoted by T in Figure
2, is therefore the per unit social cost of production. If, for simplicity,
we assume that T is constant over the relevant range of output, then Ss
is parallel to Sp. In the absence of intervention, equilibrium output will
be Qp, clearly in excess of the social optimum Qs. However, if a tax
equal to the amount of social cost, T, is imposed on producers, this will
cause the supply curve Sp to shift up to, and coincide with, Ss. This is
because producers will attempt to pass the tax on to consumers by raising
the per unit price of their output by the amount T. As indicated in Figure
2, the ultimate effect of the imposition of a per unit tax of T, equal to
the marginal social costs of production, is to generate the socially optimal
level of output, Qs.
In the context of the Superfund cleanups, imposition of a tax on producers and disposers of hazardous wastes would provide revenues for
cleanup operations while simultaneously encouraging the internalization
of the social costs of waste generation and disposal. However, as the
preceding discussion suggests, for maximum effect this tax should vary
with individual waste streams; the tax rate being determined according
to the amount of risk associated with each waste.
Reduced Potentialfor Litigation
An important but often overlooked aspect of government intervention
in the market place is the likelihood that a specific law or regulation will
precipitate legal action on the part of affected parties. Litigation involves
costs to society and consequently should be taken into account in the
assessment of the aggregate impacts of a proposed regulation or piece of
legislation. Such costs include both the opportunity cost of human resources (lawyers, judges, etc.) and as in the case of Superfund, the delay
in cleanup incurred while the legal dispute is settled.
In the context of tax proposals such as those considered here, the
potential for litigation depends on a number of factors. These factors
include: 1) how clearly the tax base is defined, that is, who is liable for
the tax, and 2) the identification of activities and substances subject to
the tax.
Complementarity of the Tax to the Overall Regulatory Scheme
While CERCLA and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976 (RCRA)4 2 are distinct pieces of legislation they nonetheless interact
to a substantial degree. What differences do exist are primarily of a
temporal origin, that is, RCRA is concerned with the disposition of newly
42. 42 U.S.C. §§6901-87 (1982).
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created hazardous wastes,43 while CERCLA is concerned with wastes
previously disposed of. 4 Hence, it is important to take into account the
effects of provisions in one piece of legislation on the goals of the other.
To the extent that the provisions of CERCLA encourage the realization
of the goals associated with RCRA, additional gains in social welfare
may be realized.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE TAX ALTERNATIVES IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE POLICY GOALS
In this section, each of the alternative tax mechanisms are examined
and compared in the context of the seven goals identified above. For
simplicity, the six tax alternatives are grouped together under the principal
headings of feedstock taxes, broad-based industry taxes, and waste-end
taxes. The instances are explicitly noted where the outcome of the analysis
is dependent upon the specific form of a tax, for example, version of a
waste-end tax.
Administrative Feasibility
The bulk of the original Superfund revenues was provided by a feedstock tax on 42 primary chemicals and crude oil going to refineries or
imported into the U.S.45 Experience with the feedstock tax indicates that
it embodies a high degree of administrative flexibility, that is, it has been
relatively simple to administer and enforce. Approximately 600 firms
contributed to the original Superfund via feedstock taxes. In fact, however, almost 50 percent of the current tax has been borne by ten major
chemical and petroleum companies.'4 This relatively small tax base facilitates the monitoring of tax payments and potential tax liabilities.
A broad-based industry tax would affect a substantially larger tax base
than would a feedstock tax similar to the one provided for in the original
Superfund.47 However, because a broad-based industry tax such as an
excise tax on the sales of firms could utilize ijata already collected and
reported for tax purposes, it should be fairly easy to administer. Additionally, in the absence of income tax evasion on the part of affected
firms, enforcement should be relatively easy since payment of the tax
4
could be incorporated into existing tax schedules filed by firms each year. 1
Unlike feedstock taxes or a broad-based industry tax, a waste-end tax
would impose substantial new data requirements. Depending upon the
43. CONGRESSIONAL. BUDGET OFFIcE, supra note 23. at xiii.

44. Id.
45. See supra text at note 13.
46. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFIcE, supra note 23, at 32.
47. Id.at 89.
48. MANAGEmb'rT ANALYSIS CENTER, supra note 27. at 96-99.
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specific form of the waste-end tax, the agency charged with the responsiblity of collecting the tax would require data on the number and identity
of potential taxpayers (true for any of the tax mechanisms considered
here); the quantities of waste being treated, stored, or disposed; and the
type(s) of treatment, storage, and disposal option(s) being utilized by
each. Clearly, the amount of additional data required to successfully
administer and enforce the tax will increase with the complexity of the
waste-end tax. To the extent that this data is not readily available this
factor may
seriously undercut the administrative feasibility of a waste49
end tax.
Revenue Generation
Experience to date indicates that a feedstock tax is capable of generating
substantial revenues (that is, $250 million per year"). However, while
the revenue stream should be fairly stable if tax rates are kept relatively
low, stability could be adversely affected to the extent that higher rates
generate negative secondary impacts in affected markets. For example,
substantial reductions in the quantity of feedstocks demanded could result
from the increase in price brought on by the tax. 5 Given that the tax
rates proposed thus far are a fixed dollar amount per unit of output this
would lead to less tax revenues than the estimate of revenue when such
quantity reductions are not accounted for.
Proponents of a broad-based industry tax have pointed to revenue
generating capabilities as a prime argument in favor of its adoption. For
example, the Congressional Budget Office has estimated that a tax of 5.5
percent on the sales of firms whose net corporate receipts exceed $5
million annually could generate $1 billion in annual tax revenues. 2 Additionally, it has been estimated that an 8 percent tax on the salesof firms
in excess of $10 million would raise the price of most products by a few
tenths of one cent.53 This suggests that, to the extent that the tax does
not undermine the stability of the tax base, the resulting revenue stream
could be expected to remain fairly stable over time.
49. A great deal of this data is currently unavailable in a comprehensive forrhat. To date, there
is no sound estimate of the actual number of hazardous waste generators operating in the United
States. More importantly, there is not a current data base that records the amount of hazardous waste
generated or the disposition of that waste by TSD option employed. The EPA has undertaken efforts
to estimate these figures. However, their efforts have met with considerable difficulties thus far and
are not expected to generate reliable results in the near future. See also U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFF'ICE, supra note 20, and OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at 46-48.
50. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 23, at 32.
51. This, in fact, is the argument that feedstock industries have made in the course of the debate
over the reauthorization of Superfund. Studies that have been cited in support of the industries' point
include MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS CENTER, supra note 27.
52. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFICE, supra note 23, at 89.

53. MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS CENTER, IMPACT OF SUPERFUND EXCISE TAX ON SELECTED CONSUMER
GOODS AND SERVICES 2 (Nov. 4, 1985).
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The revenue generating capability of a waste-end tax as well as the
stability of the resulting revenue stream will depend on the form of the
waste-end tax in question. Recent studies indicate that, depending upon
the form of the waste-end tax, between $0.3 billion and $2.7 billion could
be generated in the first year.54 However, it is important to note that in
as much as a waste-end tax is successful in encouraging waste reduction
and shifts to recycling and recovery of hazardous wastes, this will reduce
the stability of the revenue stream over time. According to the studies
we examined, depending on the form of the waste-end tax employed,
annual revenues could be expected to decline by as much as 50 percent
over a five-year period."
Incentivesfor Waste Reduction
The economic effect of a feedstock tax is to increase the price of certain
inputs to production processes. In the case of chemical feedstocks, the
effect is to increase the price of inputs that are presumed to result in the
generation of hazardous wastes. This increased price may induce a reduction in the quantity of the input employed in the production process
and hence a reduction in the quantity of hazardous waste generated.
However, a flat feedstock tax does not provide any direct incentive for
waste reduction or shifts in waste management techniques employed,
because the amount.of the tax paid is not a function of either of these
factors. Any reductions in waste generation that did result from the tax
would instead be the result of shifts to lower-priced substitute inputs
which lead to the generation of a smaller quantity of hazardous waste
per unit of output. Consequently, the potential for waste reduction as a
result of the imposition of a per unit feedstock tax appears to be low.
It was noted above that the impact of a broad-based tax on individual
firms should be relatively small.56 Additionally, the tax is in no way
related to waste generation by specific firms or the type of TSD option
employed. This suggests that a broad-based tax would have little effect
on waste generation rates or the type of TSD option employed.
Of the tax alternatives considered here, waste-end taxes possess the
greatest potential for encouraging waste reduction and shifts between
waste management techniques. This derives from the fact that waste-end
taxes provide a direct economic incentive for firms to reduce the quantity
of waste they generate. Additionally, a tax based on the type of TSD
option employed will create an incentive for shifts to relatively less costly
TSD options. However, for a tax to have any measurable impact on the
54. CONGRESSIONAL BuDGET OFFicE, supra note 23, at 72, and OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AssFsSMEmr, supra note 4, at 46-48.
55. CONGRESSIONAL BuDGET OFFICE. supra note 23, at 72.
56. See supra text at note 55.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 27

latter, it would have to be of sufficient magnitude to offset any price
advantage
that less desirable management techniques may currently pos57
sess.
Of the various forms of a waste-end tax we have considered, a fully
differentiated waste-end tax, that is, one differentiated on the basis of
degree of hazard and TSD option employed, should have the greatest
combined effect on waste generation rates and type of TSD option employed. Conversely, a flat waste-end tax can be expected to be less
effective. However, it is important to bear in mind the trade-off between
waste reduction and the stability of the revenue stream over time. This
trade-off will be greatest with a fully differentiated waste-end tax and
least with a flat waste-end tax. How policymakers view the relative importance of these two goals will determine which of the two approaches,
in fact, is preferred.
Equity
Although a feedstock tax ostensibly places the burden of financing the
cleanup of Superfund sites on those individuals responsible for their
creation-generators and disposers of hazardous wastes-it is not clear
that such a tax is, in fact, equitable. This assertion is based on the
observation that there is not a clear match between the quantities of wastes
attributable to the feedstocks taxed and wastes found at Superfund sites. 8
Additionally, depending on how much of the tax is passed on to specific
consumers of the feedstock being taxed (that is, producers of intermediate
and final goods who are in turn generators of wastes found at Superfund
sites), the burden of Superfund financing borne by responsible parties
may not be proportionate to the. amount of Superfund costs they are
responsible for. Finally, if feedstock producing industries suffer substantial adverse economic impacts as a result of imposition of the tax, justification for the tax on the basis of the ability-to-pay principle may be
seriously eroded.
It has been noted above that a broad-based industry tax has the advantage of spreading the financial burden of cleanup across broad segments of industry with the result that the impact on individual firms is
minimal. 59 To the extent that responsible parties cannot be identified and
forced to pay the costs of cleanup, such a tax could then be thought of
as equitable. Specifically, it is argued that a broad range of producers
and consumers benefited from past disposal practices in the form of lower
production costs and product prices. However, a tax on current producers
57. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at 46.
58. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTC'IONAGENCY, supra note 14,

59. See supra text at note 54.

at 5-4, 5.
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and consumers of those goods would not necessarily fall on the same
individuals who realized past benefits. By spreading out the tax burden
over as many taxpayers as possible, a broad-based tax would minimize
the amount of inequity suffered by any one individual in the tax base.
Finally, waste-end taxes are frequently cited as an equitable means of
financing Superfund cleanups. To the extent that wastes generated and
disposed of end up at Superfund sites, responsible parties would, in fact,
bear the cleanup costs. However, it is not certain that the amount of tax
paid would equal the cleanup costs incurred. Additionally, there is the
possibility that many hazardous wastes generated and disposed of will
never require the expenditure of Superfund revenues. Consequently, it is
not certain that a waste-end tax could be interpreted as being equitable
in all instances.
Economic Efficiency
In the initial version of CERCLA, individual feedstock taxes were
calculated on the basis of the percentage amount of hazardous wastes
generated attributable to each feedstock.' While this may serve as a
useful first approximation to the amount of the various constituents found
at Superfund sites, the efficiency of this tax is questionable. First, it does
not recognize-the relationship between specific wastes and the amount of
risk they pose. For example, two hazardous wastes, A and B, associated
with different feedstocks may be generated in equal amounts but pose
substantially different levels of risk when disposed in a landfill. Because
each imposes a different marginal social- cost per unit of waste disposed,
the feedstocks should be taxed at different rates in an effort to achieve a
socially efficient outcome. The implication is that any form of a feedstock
tax that does not take into account the degree of hazard will in all likelihood fail to generate an economically efficient outcome.
The second source of uncertainty about the efficiency of any feedstock
tax concerns the degree to which the tax is borne by the actual generators
and disposers of the hazardous wastes associated with the feedstock taxed.
To the extent that feedstock producers are unable to pass through the tax
to the actual producers of the hazardous wastes, the incentive for waste
reduction, etc., is lost. The upshot is that generators and disposers of
hazardous wastes will not take all of the social costs of production into
account in their decision making process.
A broad-based tax would not appear to create incentives for generators
of hazardous wastes to reduce the quantity of wastes generated or shift
to more reliable TSD options. This stems from the fact that the tax is not
related to the generation or disposal of hazardous wastes. Additionally,
60. See supra text at note 14.
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the tax rates proposed thus far are so small as to create little, if any,
incentive for generators of hazardous wastes to alter their behavior. Consequently, a broad-based tax would appear to be least likely to achieve
an efficient solution to the problem of cleaning up abandoned hazardous
waste disposal sites.
Of the three types of taxes considered, waste-end taxes have the greatest
potential for achieving an economically efficient solution to the problem
of hazardous waste disposal and cleanup. As indicated above, efficiency
requires that producers consider the full costs of production when deciding
how much to produce. A waste-end tax induces this type of behavior and,
in the process, may lead to a reduction in the number of potential future
hazardous waste disposal sites requiring remedial action.
It is important to point out, however, that the form of the waste-end
tax employed will have a substantial impact on the level of efficiency
realized. Specifically, from a theoretical perspective, a waste-end tax
differentiated on the basis of degree of hazard and TSD option employed
could be expected to be the most efficient of the different waste-end taxes
considered here, with respect to its effect on waste generation and disposal. On the other hand, if tax rates are set relatively low, a flat, per
unit waste-end tax may be no more efficient than any other tax structures
we have considered. 6'
Potentialfor Litigation
Experience to date indicates that a-flat feedstock tax provides little
potential for litigation by affected parties. The requirements as to who
pays, and how much, are straightforward. This leaves little opportunity
for dispute over tax liabilities. The same conclusion applies to broadbased taxes.
In the case of a waste-end tax, as the complexity of the tax increases,
so does the potential for litigation contesting the tax. For example, there
will be an incentive for firms producing wastes classified as most hazardous to contest this categorization in an effort to reduce their potential
tax bill. This incentive will increase with the tax rate imposed. Litigation
may take the form of suits contesting the validity of the test or criteria
used to classify wastes according to degree of hazard. Additionally, suit
could be brought on an individual basis for specific waste streams.
Complementarity of the Tax to the Overall Regulatory Scheme
Neither a feedstock tax nor a broad-based industry tax can be expected
to appreciably affect the realization of goals associated with hazardous
61. The point here is that if the tax does not alter the behavior of the affected firms, i.e., there
is not a shift in the selection of the TSD options they employ or the amount of waste generated,
then the overall efficiency associated with the market has not been altered.
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waste legislation such as RCRA. Clearly, because it is unrelated to hazardous waste generation and disposal, a broad-based industry tax would
be relatively ineffectual in this respect. In the case of a feedstock tax,
the impact on waste generation and disposal is indirect, at best, as indicated in the discussion of feedstock taxes and waste reduction efforts.62
Waste-end taxes, on the other hand, by their very nature act as a
complement to the requirements of RCRA. This effect is strongest in the
case of a waste-end tax differentiated according to the degree of hazard
associated with the waste in question and the disposal technique employed. However, even in the case of a flat waste-end tax, establishing
a tax that is large enough to affect the quantity of wastes disposed would
facilitate the RCRA goal of reduced risk from hazardous waste generation
and disposal.
V. SUMMARY
Both the feedstock tax and the broad-based industry tax can be expected
to be fairly easy to administer. Additionally, both tax mechanisms could
generate a fairly substantial and constant revenue stream over time.63
These conclusions are borne out by the experience with the current CERCLA
of the
feedstock tax and recent studies that have estimated the impact
6
1
revenues.
tax
and
output
industrial
on
tax
industry
broad-based
A waste-end tax is also capable of generating substantial revenues.
However, to the extent that such a tax is successful in encouraging waste
reduction and the use of lower-taxed TSD methods (as would be the case
under waste-end tax options 2, 3, and 4), tax revenues could be expected
to decline over time. Additionally, as the complexity of the waste-end
tax increases, associated data requirements could severely limit the ad' ministrative feasibility of such an approach, especially in the near term.65
With respect to incentives for waste reduction and the use of alternative
TSD options, waste-end taxes possess a clear advantage. Moreover, as
the complexity of the waste-end tax increases, so does its ability to achieve
this goal, ceteris paribus.' Feedstock taxes offer an indirect incentive
for waste reduction efforts and have no impact on the TSD option employed. Finally, broad-based taxes would appear to be largely ineffective
on both counts.
As noted in the discussion of equity vis-a-vis cleanup of abandoned
62.
63.
64.
65.

See supra text at notes 57-58.
In the case of feedstock taxes this assertion assumes that tax rates are not set too high.
See supra text at notes 54-55.
Of the waste-end taxes considered, the flat tax is the simplest and the fully differentiated tax

is the most complex.
66. Note, however, that to the extent the incentive for waste reduction is positively related to the
complexity of the tax structure employed, ease of administration, which is inversely related to the
complexity of the tax structure, and the goal of waste reduction are inversely related.
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hazardous waste sites, 67 identifying the equitable approach is no simple
matter. In fact, a number of different approaches could be considered
equitable depending on one's point of view. As such, none of the alternative tax mechanisms considered stands out as clearly more equitable
than the others. Even a waste-end tax cannot be assumed clearly superior
because there is not an established one-to-one relationship between those
individuals who would pay the tax and those parties whose past actions
are responsible for existing Superfund sites.
With respect to economic efficiency, assuming that the tax is set at the
proper level, a fully differentiated waste-end tax creates the greatest incentives for efficient behavior by generators of hazardous wastes. However, it cannot be concluded that a more simple waste-end tax, that is, a
flat tax, would be any more efficient than a feedstock tax, or even a
broad-based tax for that matter. This latter conclusion reflects the minimal
incentives for waste reduction and the use of alternative TSD options
associated with a flat.waste-end tax.
Of the three major types of tax mechanisms we have considered here,
it would appear that waste-end taxes are most likely to be litigated. This
results from the greater potential for disputes over the treatment or classification of specific waste streams. Feedstock taxes and broad-based taxes
are, by contrast, rather straightforward in their application. On the other
hand, waste-end taxes would probably most effectively complement the
goals and objectives of RCRA. This results primarily from the ability of
a waste-end tax to encourage waste reduction efforts as well as the use
of socially preferred TSD options.
In summary, none of the alternative tax mechanisms we have examined
here clearly dominates. Rather, the relative importance that society places
on the various goals the tax is intended to achieve will determine which
of the tax structures better serves society's interests. In fact, as was noted
in the introduction to Part III, a combination of these taxes may prove
most beneficial. These are questions, however, that must be left to policymakers.

67. See supra text at notes 32-40.

